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The course of public policy often falls into patterns over time.
For many years lawmakers may make consistent decisions on the
basis of certain familiar, traditional assumptions. And then, as
they acquire new values and priorities, these lawmakers gradually
alter the direction of their decisions until a new policy pattern has
emerged. For example, during certain periods of Wisconsin's history, the decisions of lawmakers regarding air pollution were quite
similar. But at the ends of these periods, air pollution decisions
were quite different than they were at the beginning of the period.
What were some of the factors that entered the decisional calculus
of lawmakers during these periods of consistent policymaking?
What precipitated changes in policy and in what ways did these
changes occur? This essay shall sketch these patterns and changes
of public policy and offer an explanation of why they occurred as
they did.
While several legal institutions in Wisconsin made law regarding the air resource and its pollution, the judiciary best reflected
policy trends and developments. Judges articulated air pollution
law in the process of deciding lawsuits. These lawsuits were typically not brought by public officials but, rather, were initiated by
private parties. The complaining plaintiff was normally a homeowner whose health or property had been somehow damaged by
emissions from a specific source of pollution. While the defendant
was usually a privately owned manufacturing enterprise, sometimes the defendant was a municipal corporation whose sewage
treatment plant produced noxious fumes. Most judge-made public
policy relevant to the air pollution problem was therefore expressed in the context of the citizen lawsuit - citizen suits against
private decision makers and occasional citizen suits against public
decision makers. The impact of lawsuits prosecuted on behalf of
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the general public by public air resource protectors (city attorneys,
district attorneys, attorneys general) will also be discussed.
Before analyzing the course of public policy made in the context of citizen lawsuits, one should first understand the intellectual,
social, and economic character of the times in which these lawsuits
first arose. For shifts in judicial policy were not so much due to
changing legal doctrine as they were a result of altered social circumstance.
I.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CONTEXT: CHANGING

EVALUATIONS OF NATURAL RESOURCES

The environmental images that dominated our early national
consciousness were often cluttered by reflections of competing values. On the one hand, early writers perceived in American nature
an unspoiled moral order. By following a simple, subsistence economy the American settler might find another Eden, a pastoral
garden in which one might recover an innocence that was lost to
Europeans. In contrast to this vision of a New World where an
American farmer could establish himself in ecological harmony
with the land was the image of America as a fertile expanse to be
developed by man. In Letters from an American Farmer,' published in 1782, Hector St. John d. Crevecoeur wrote of an America
offering "a boundless field for the exertion of human industry."
Crevecoeur not only predicted that the continent one day would
show substantial cities, but also productive, self-sufficient farms.
Nearly a century later, this dual view of nature was continued by
George Perkins Marsh. In The Study of Nature,' originally published in 1860, Marsh argued that the progress of civilization required extensive alterations in the earth's natural order. But by
appealing at once to American pride in material achievement and
to romantic delight in the natural world, he offered an effective
answer to the lingering belief of pastoralists that an industrial
society nacessarily must destroy man's affection for nature.
After the Civil War, the widespread popular faith in the beneficent dynamics of increased productivity seemed to win out over the
earlier vision of a natural order that would redeem a man's life
from the corrupting artificiality of civilization. Americans were
busy with private business. American society was becoming a com1. CREVECOEUR, Letters From an American Farmer (1782).
2. Marsh, The Study of Nature, Christian Examiner, (January, 1860).
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munity of expectant capitalists. The guidemarks were largely economic. The self-regulating market was the central social institution. By 1870, the market-centered culture had caused a dominant
environmental image to emerge. Nature was no longer a pastoral

garden, but instead was an inexhaustible reservoir of natural resources to be juxtaposed against scarcities of labor and of liquid
cash and long-term investment capital. While the market supplied

the transactional mechanism, the physical environment provided
the raw ingredients for a resource-exploitative economy. The at-

mosphere was one such raw material. It supplied life-giving air, the
oxygen necessary to complete the combustion process, and most

important, a seemingly unpollutable garbage dump for society's
wastes.
The predominant nineteenth century American ideal was a tri-

partite vision of material sufficiency and productive growth, stimulated and encouraged by the legal process, and supplied with an
endless supply of physical resources.3 These same three themes
were outlined in nearly every Governor's Message to the Wisconsin

Legislature in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. First,
these executives expressed and reflected a widespread belief in the
beneficent potential of increased productivity, manufacturing, and
industrial growth. 4 Second, the state's governors generally con-

curred in the usefulness of the law as a means of multiplying the
productive power of Wisconsin's economy through traditional
market processes. 5 Third, governors professed faith in the unde3. Mermin, Law and the Promotion of Enterprise (manuscript on deposit in University
of Wisconsin Law Library).
4. Faith in the promise of an ever-increasing curve of material productivity was expressed as early as 1841, when Governor James D. Doty claimed that "industry, economy
and an increase of our domestic manufactures are the surest means which can be employed
to remedy the ills of the state." Governor Barstow proclaimed in 1855 that "prosperity has
crowned enterprise and industry, until the admission is compelled that no State presents
greater inducements to the various industrial classes than our own." The advantages of
industrial growth were similarly summed up by Governor Kohler in 1929:
To accomplish our development we need more industrial activity, for manufacture
brings into the community daily . . . immense sums. This income is distributed in
the form of taxes, in the purchase of raw materials, and in the form of payrolls, the
wage earners becoming customers of the merchants and clients of the banks. There
is no tax delinquency in farm areas located in the neighborhood of industrial locations.
See Governor's Messages to the Legislature (1841, 1855, 1929).
5. In 1852, Governor Farwell implored the legislature to enact laws to insure "a good,
sure, and convenient market for the staple productions of our soil - not a market fluctuating and temporary." Governor Randall was more specific in 1861. He suggested to the
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pletable abundance of the state's natural endowments, and were
quick to see in large quantities of natural resources a ready answer
to comparative shortages of liquid cash and investment capital.
Unfortunately, throughout most of the nineteenth century these
same assumptions were to guide the judiciary's response to pollution of the air resource.
II.

THE JUDICIARY AND AIR POLLUTION: STRUCTURAL DEFECTS

AND COMMON LAW LIMITATIONS AFFECTING DECISION-MAKING

By the mid-nineteenth century, then, economic considerations
largely governed the actions of American society. The legal process
was viewed primarily as a means of protecting and encouraging the

productive and investment components of an expanding economy.
Legal checks upon resource depleting or polluting behavior were
virtually non-existent. Beginning in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, though, one of the costs of this unregulated resourceintensive economy was becoming evident. Factories, manufactur-

ing plants and even individually owned shops were pouring more
legislature "the propriety of a law exempting from taxation all establishments as may be
erected as a means of encouragement to manufacturers." Governor James Lewis not only
asked that "measures should be adopted to lay before Eastern capitalists the great advantages to be derived from manufacturing in our state," he also declared in 1864 that "efforts
should be made to remove impediments to manufacturing." Would not a strong antipollution policy have been an "impediment to manufacturing?" Willingness to use law in
order to induce settlement of manufacturing interests within Wisconsin continued over time.
Over sixty years after Governor Lewis' 1864 message, Governor Emanual Philipp similarly
exhorted the legislature in 1917 to "give reasonable assistance to any legitimate effort that
is calculated to call the attention of homeseekers to the industrial advantages of the state."
See Governor's Messages to the Legislature, (1852, 1861, 1864 and 1917).
6. Governors repeatedly emphasized the seemingly limitless quantities of physical resources present in the state, and then in the next breath urged willing legislators to provide
laws which would help manufacturing interests tap this potential wealth. One year after
statehood, in 1849, Governor Nelson Dewey became the first public official in Wisconsin
to articulate the popular Assumption of Inexhaustible Resources: "Recent discoveries have
opened in various parts of the state, rich beds of iron ore which is said to be unsurpassed in
quality and inexhaustible in quantity." This message was repeated in 1857 by Governor
Coles Bashford. Governor Bashford called for the continuation of the Geological Survey,
because such a study would not only "determine the extent of our mineral wealth," but
would also "tend to greatly increase this wealth and diversify industry." Governor James
Lewis likewise stated his faith in unbounded natural resources when, in 1864, he declared
to the legislature:
Perhaps no State presents greater advantages to manufacturers than does Wisconsin,
and no State needs them more. With water power in abundance, unsurpassed iron,
copper and lead, in short, nearly all kinds of raw materials [are] in unlimited quantities.
See Governor's Messages to the Legislature (1848, 1857, 1864).
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and more wastes into the atmosphere, and the air was becoming
polluted. In some cities, such as Pittsburgh, the air pollution problem was already quite acute by 1807. In that year an English
traveler observed of Pittsburgh:
The great consumption of coal abounding in sulphur, and its
smoke condensing into a vast quantity of lamp black, gives the
outside of the houses a dirty and disagreeable appearance, even
Britain where a
more than the most populous town of Great
7
proportional great quantity of coal is used.
In other areas of the country, such as Wisconsin, industrialization had not reached the point by the 1970's where entire cities
or sections of cities were blanketed by smoke. But even in predominantly rural states, occasional instances of severe air pollution "Iere
forcing the legal process to respond. In England the first legal
response to air pollution took the form of executive and legislative
action.8 But in the United States, these more centralized public
policy announcements regarding the air resource did not come
about until the twentieth century. The best indicator of air pollution public policy in nineteenth century America is instead found
in privately initiated court actions that resolved focused disputes
between two parties - complaining pollution receptor and
pollution-producing defendant.
There were practical reasons why public policy regarding air
pollution was first made in litigation. Most instances of air pollution were simple situations in which one factory's smoke blew onto
the premises of a homedweller. Also, usually only one or two such
residents were affected at any given time by any given pollution
source. Before 1900, then, the effects of air pollution were not yet
so noticeable or widespread as to interest the customary recipients
of broad complaints - legislators, executive officers, or local political bosses. Since most disputes were between one pollution receptor and one pollution producer, and since courts functioned best
7. See, e.g., O'Connor, The History of the Smoke Nuisance and ofSmoke Abatement
in Pittsburgh, Industrial World, Pittsburgh (March 24, 1913).
8. Royal Proclamation had been issued in 1306 prohibiting artificers from using sea

coal, and in 1853 an Act of Parliament required abatement of smoke from stacks above
London Bridge.
SHAW & OWENS, THE SMOKE PROBLEM OF GREAT CITIES

(1925);

EVELYN, FUMIFuG-

UIM: OR, THE INCONVENIENCE OF THE AER, AND SMOKE OF LONDON DISSIPATED TOGETHER

WITH SOME REMEDIES, reprinted by the National Smoke Abatement Society of England
(1933); Kennedy and Porter, Air Pollution: Its Control and Abatement, 8 VAND. L. REV.
854 (1955).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

when they resolved focused controversies, the judiciary was structurally well suited to hear air pollution cases. Each party could
employ counsel who argued to a hypothetically impartial judge or
jury. Each party also agreed beforehand to abide by the court's
ruling. Since'the court could enforce its rulings through the use of
its contempt powers, both the winner and loser of the controversy
were under legal compulsion to carry out the court's wishes.
Thus Wisconsin public policy in the air pollution field began
with court-made law. But Wisconsin judges were not free agents
in making public policy. There were structural and common law
constraints which affected their decisions. To put Wisconsin case
law into perspective, one should first note some of the limiting
institutional characteristics of the judicial process. Second, one
should appraise what Wisconsin judges did in relation to the range
of possibilities revealed in the general course of judge-made law
affecting air pollution, as that law unfolded in the United States
at large.
A. InstitutionalLimitations of the JudicialProcess
One defect inherent in the rules of judge-made law was that
such rules were made applicable to parties outside the original
lawsuit only by more litigation. Lawsuits were between immediately interested parties only, and any given reason for a decision
applied in no other cases except as it supplied doctrinal precedent.
The lawsuits that had some broader consequence were typically
episodic, and even then the judges were compelled to address the
issues one litigation at a time. By this piecemeal adjudication the
courts could not solve the problem of whether and to what degree
the air resource should be polluted or preserved. Only the legislature could make decisions that encompassed all the broad range
of interests involved in air pollution controversies. The courts were
limited to making policy within the frame of a single case, shaped
by a focused dispute between two identifiable parties.
The court's inability to assume managerial functions subsequent to decision was another reason litigation was an unreliable
tool for protecting natural resources. Courts did not have the administrative personnel or capacity to follow up decisions limiting
the use of the air resource as a dumping ground. Judges had no
smokewatchers to send to the site of the original controversy to
ensure that the plaintiff was no longer being bothered by the defendant's emissions. Nor did judges have technological or scientific
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means of determining how much pollution was allowable and how
much was harmful. The choice was often between closing the operations of the offender altogether or requiring the embittered plaintiff to breathe poisoned air; little ground remained in between.
The judicial process also placed imposing burdens on the
citizen-litigant. These burdens worked to deter private initiation of
lawsuits, and therefore many air polluters were never made accountable to judge or jury. Most private-party pollution receptors
did not have the money to bring an action in the trial court, much
less pursue an appeal to the state supreme court. And once in
court, problems of proof were nearly insurmountable. The burden
rested on the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that he sustained damages, and that his damages were the proximate result of omissions or commissions of the defendant. In air
pollution cases, such a connection was often impossible to prove,
especially as the number and variety of polluters increased. Defendants typically claimed that they should and could not be singled
out as one wrongdoer among several potential wrongdoers in the
vicinity. It was equally difficult for courts to apportion responsibility among many polluters, each of whom made some contribution
to the damages. Moreover, courts usually offered a remedy only
after damage was done or impended, and remedies could only be
employed where harm was measurable in money terms. Unfortunately, air pollution seemed more often an aggravating annoyance
than a cause of pecuniary damages.
B. The Law of Torts: Defects Inherent in the Fault Doctrine
The citizen-plaintiff also had to decide which substantive common law concept he would use to attack pollution emissions. Conceivably the pollution receptor could have made an agreement with
the nearby polluter whereby the receptor would pay the polluter to
stop polluting. This contract could in turn be enforced in court if
payments were made and the polluter continued to pollute. This
kind of agreement was unlikely, though, as payments to one polluter would have no bearing on the conduct of other polluters. Also,
if there were more than one pollution receptor, and they were
affected disproportionately, it would be difficult to secure some
kind of allocation of payments among them. Moreover, the basic
question of whether it would be worth the benefits of clean air to
bargain and pay for it was a decision that was beyond the decisionmaking means of most pollution receptors. In short, information
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and transaction costs prevented contract, and contract law, from
providing a useful framework within which to pursue courtenforced pollution abatement.
"Property" was another common law concept which could
have been used by the citizen-plaintiff. When public policy considers a certain relation between individuals and economic assets socially desirable, law will usually rule that the individuals have
"property" in those assets. And when one has property in something, this generally means (1) that he has a right to use, enjoy, and
transfer his right in the thing, and (2) that his relation to or interest
in the thing is protected against invasion by others. The elements
of property law thus seemed to offer pollution receptors a measure
of protection against interference with the use of their property and
could have been used as a basis for causes of action against polluters whose emissions invaded the receptor's lands. Instead, property law was effectively used by polluters. Polluters claimed that
ownership of polluting property allowed them to entertain the expectation of enjoying the productive employment of that property
relatively free of legal checks by pollution receptors.' The maxim
cujus est solum, ejus est esque ad coelum (whose is the soil, his it
is up to the sky) was invoked to establish a vested right in owners
to use the atmosphere over their land as a free waste receptacle.
Courts consistently rebuffed plaintiff-receptors who attempted to
challenge industry's claim to the air's waste-elimination capability.
Nineteenth century judges refused to acknowledge a common law
property interest in clean air. But they did recognize a legal interest
in the waste disposal uses of air.
If contract and property did not afford relief to plaintiffs, tort
law did. Air pollution was non-consensual, and tort law determined
social interests with regard to non-consensual relations. Instances
of air pollution were continuous over time, and tort law provided
9. That private property took on the function of assuring a large, legally sanctioned
autonomy for private decision-makers was in part because 19th and early 20th century
judges believed in the efficacy of giving property owners substantially unlimited discretion
for private decisions on using land for profit. Just as it was not contemplated that the law
would interfere with the free and profitable use of the incidents of ownership, it was not
expected that judges would enjoin a flourishing industrial concern because of a few complaints over air pollution. See Galbraith v. Oliver, 3 Pitts. R. 78 (1867); Rhodes v. Dunbar,
57 Pa. 274 (1868). This judicial attitude in part reflected 19th century favor for adjusting
relations by contract; if costs to another were not focused and large enough to be the subject
matter of a contract bargain, then the implicit judgment was that there was no public policy
concern with the incidence of costs (at least as embodied in the law of property).
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a means of restraining wrongdoing that had continuity of occurrence. By supplying a body of doctrine that determined over some
range of human concerns what grievances were legally actionable,
tort law also provided a means of ventilating complaints and remedying wrongs. And since it had an impact on decisions affecting
the distribution of capital and costs, the law of torts also had a
practical relationship to the exercise of will that both the law of
contract and property sought to channel.
Perhaps the one feature of tort law that made it so popular
among plaintiffs' lawyers and reviewing judges was that it embodied the traditional assumption that unless an evil will or faulty
actor could be found, there was no social offense. The perennial
need for scapegoats and villains was thus satisfied by resort to the
idea of tort. The law of torts was grounded in the concept of
liability, or legal responsibility, for the results of one's actions.
Liability, in turn, rested on a showing of fault, or wrongdoing. It
was the fault doctrine, then, that made torts seem so attractive a
theory to injured parties seeking judicial relief from air polluters.
However, this fixation on fault-placing, exhibited by plaintiffs
and judges alike, limited the effective scope of judicial controls
over air pollution. For actionable fault to exist, the plaintiff usually
had to demonstrate that he had suffered injury distinctive to or
focused in some special way on himself. The tenacity of this view
produced three adverse effects. First, since plaintiffs were required
to prove special damage to health, business or some moneymeasurable asset, injury to more amorphous, aesthetic or recreational interests was never sufficient to ground a cause of action."0
10. See Cropsey v. Murphy, I Hilt. 126 (N.Y. 1856), where the court agreed that the
defendant's operation had created a tort only after the plaintiff had proven to the jury's
satisfaction that the gases from defendant's plant were injurious to plaintiff's health. The
requirement of a showing of distinctive personal harm or loss was eventually expanded (in

standing cases) to include harm to plaintiff's aesthetic or recreational interests. See Association of Data Processing v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
The decision to use a liability theory of punishing and deterring harm-producing parties
also did not usually consider the more important economic question of which party could
best bear costs. One party might be legally required to bear the cost of abating the harmful
activity, but the other might be better able to avoid the cost of harm altogether. Instead of

spending so much time finding guilty or faulty parties, law makers should have considered
who was the cheapest cost avoider. The fault doctrine also did not typically address the issue
of which activity caused which cost. Those who used fault concentrated instead on determining what was the cost of the harm; if the cost of the harm was great enough, the usual result

was to find fault in the party causing the harm. But, particularly in air pollution cases, the
most crucial question: what is the cost of what? This is a more important issue than what

the actual cost is.
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Second, the court's discretion in assessing the amount of loss

proved worked against even the rare successful plaintiff. Fearing
that a liberal damages doctrine might burden business operations
and discourage risk-taking, judges were generally loathe to assess
more than token damages against tortious but productive industry." Third, the court-imposed prerequisite of particularized

plaintiff-related injury foreclosed the possibility that parties might
raise the harm done to others as a means. of bolstering their de-

mand for common law or equitable intervention. Early air pollution cases displayed a strong reluctance to grant any legal relief
when those most adversely affected by defendant's pollution were

not parties to the action. As one court noted in 1868 in dismissing
what was conceded to be an otherwise actionable air pollution

claim: "It was not competent for the plaintiff to show that the
property of other persons was injuriously affected by the cause of
which he complained."'"
This narrow perception of the air pollution situation occasioned
by use of the fault doctrine precluded judges from addressing the
diffused costs and interests involved whenever noxious smoke or
gases were emitted into the atmosphere. It also delayed the idea
of class actions or suits by private attorneys general as ways of

presenting a larger body of interests than that of a particular plaintiff. By the early twentieth century such limitations of tort law in
the context of a private lawsuit eventually created the demand for
more centralized pollution control legislation.
11. See Morton Horwitz, Damage Judgments, Legal Liability and Economic Development Before the Civil War (unpublished manuscript 1970); Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 129
(1873) (failure to prove cause and effect relationship prevents court from enjoining
pollution-causing factory); Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio 311 (N.Y. 1847) ($50 awarded in token
damages for smoke emitted by steam engine boiler).
In all resource protection litigation the person or enterprise whose activities deteriorate
a resource will always be the defendant. This is because in the absence of legal constraints,
conducting a resource-deteriorating activity can foreclose the conduct of non-deteriorating
activities while the converse is never true. To obtain relief the air breather must go to court,
and it is one of the constants of the judicial system that plaintiffs carry the burden of proof
on most important issues in the lawsuit, as well as the financial burden of initiating litigation. Thus, even though substantive rules may express a policy in favor of resource conservation, basic procedural mechanisms of judicial intervention bias the system in the opposite
direction.
12. Fay v. Whitman, 100 Mass. 76, 79 (1868). See also Ottawa Gas-Light Coke Co. v.
Thompson, 39 Ill. 598 (1864). In Ottawa the court refused to allow a jury verdict for the
plaintiff to stand because "plaintiff had no interest of his own to assert - [smoke] damage,
if any, was to others and their property."
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C. The Law of Nuisance: Shortcomings and Advantages
Despite its limitations, the law of torts was generally accepted
as offering the best common law grounds upon which to base an
air pollution lawsuit. But, within tort law the plaintiff had to find
a doctrine which was narrow enough to fit the circumstances of a
pollution case, yet broad enough to encompass all the claims his
complain engendered. A plaintiff could not really argue that an
intentional trespass had been committed. Invasion of plaintiff's
airspace by defendant's emissions could not be intentional because
any such trespass was actually the result of unforeseeable shifting
wind patterns. Nor was there anything negligent (at least in the
nineteenth century) about a polluter whose stacks expelled smoke,
steam and gases; there was simply no other way in which to discharge the gaseous residue of combustion. Air pollution was certainly not an unusual, ultra-hazardous activity whose perpetrators
needed to be held strictly liable. Not only was air pollution universally practiced, but most smoke and soot emissions did not seem
3
hazardous or harmful.'
Since trespass, negligence, and strict liability theories did not
suit the nature of the air pollution problem, plaintiffs began bringing their air pollution actions under a theory of nuisance. A hybrid
of property and tort law, nuisance became so popular with plaintiffs and courts addressing air pollution controversies that it continued as the sole basis for judicial relief well into the late 1960's.
Even when the city and state took over air resource management
functions from the courts, air pollution's nuisance-like character
remained the basis upon which the government's police power was
invoked. For many years most city ordinances and state enabling
13. Although trespass, negligence and strict liability were rejected as suitable causes of

action in the 19th century mid-20th century courts have experimented with these theories
with mixed results. Most of the important aspects of pollution control law where trespass
is used as the theory of the action can be seen in Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp.
169 (D. Ore. 1963); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960); Fairview Farms, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 176 F. Supp.
178 (D. Ore. 1959); Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954),
affd, 236 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 968 (1957). Private control of

air pollution through an action for damages based on negligence was used in Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958); Greyhound Corp. v. Blakley, 262 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1958); Hagy v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp.,
122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d 86 (1954). Strict liability concepts were used by complain-

ants in an air pollution case in Waschak v. Moffat Coal Co., 379 Pa. 441, 109 A.2d 310
(1954); Fritz v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 45 Del. 427, 75 A.2d 257 (1950).
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statutes responded to
air pollution problems simply by declaring
'
smoke a "nuisance. 14

Nuisance was a distinct field of tort liability where the gravamen of an action at common law lay in interference with private
rights to use land in which one had a property interest. There was
much to the nuisance concept that tied it to a theory of trespass.
A nuisance was not only a source of annoyance, but also a continuing invasion or disturbance of another's rights. Thus, to show a
nuisance the complainant usually had to prove some continuity or
repetition in the offending action, and this was the typical situation
where pollution was in issue. Another reason for the popularity of
nuisance among plaintiffs was that many aggrieved complainants
thought of smoke emissions near residential areas as offensive,
annoying, unpleasant disturbances. Since air pollution seemed literally a nuisance, and since a nuisance at law adequately described
the effects of polluted air that flowed over another's land, it was
natural that plaintiffs would label their complaints accordingly.
But in fact, even proof of the existence of a private air pollution
nuisance did not guarantee relief. If the pollution had continued for
some time before an action was brought, the polluter's wrongdoing
might have by then ripened into a judicially protected right through
recognition of prescriptive rights. Another exception to nuisance
law which defeated the claims of would-be litigants was the doctrine commonly referred to as "coming to the nuisance."' 5 Some
courts held that by purchasing land and moving in next to an
operating polluter, the plaintiff assumed the risk and was barred
from recovery.
If the pollution were labeled a "public" nuisance, the plaintiff's
difficulties were even greater. Public nuisances were those which
affected interests common to the general public, rather than peculiar to one or several individuals. Due to the wide diffusion of air
pollutants dispersed through shifting winds, most instances of air
pollution were probably public rather than private. This meant that
in order to prevail, the objector must prove that he suffered special
damage, different in kind from that suffered by the general public
and not just different in degree. 6
Early courts used another feature of nuisance law to defeat the
14. See Chicago Ord. of 1903, cited in Glucose Refining Co. v. Chicago, 138 F. 209
(Cir. Ct., 11.1905); Rev. Ord. of Detroit 1890 ch. 67; REV. ST. OHIO, § 1692a (1890).
15. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 91, p. 611 (4th ed., 1971).
16. Id. at § 88, p. 586.
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claims of pollution receptors seeking equitable relief. Air polluting
conduct could not be enjoined unless recovery of damages was an
inadequate remedy. But even if the plaintiff could show damages
were an inadequate remedy, injunctive relief did not automatically
follow. Before granting such relief courts often "balanced the equities." When the defendant was a major employer or manufacturer
of needed goods, this balancing usually weighed in favor of the
polluter's right to use his land and equipment as he wished. And
when polluter behavior was tested against the reasonable man standard, nineteenth century judges thought it "reasonable" for manufacturing enterprises to generate air pollution social costs.
Because of the nature of the law of nuisance, then, the picture
that emerges is a jumbled one. Courts recognized that property
owners had a right to have the air above their property free from
contamination. But when a given court was called upon actively to
protect this right, it was faced with the asserted right of the polluting party to use his property as he wished. Faced with similar fact
situations, courts often arrived at widely different results. For example, in the 1904 case of Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper
and Iron Co.,17 the Tennessee Supreme Court acknowledged that
defendant's air pollution nuisance made it impossible for the complainants to raise and harvest their crops, but declined to grant
injunctive relief. Since technical means of controlling defendant's
air pollution were not available, and since it was impossible for the
defendant to move to a more remote location, the court noted that
an injuction would only compel the defendant to stop operating its
plants. But this would make defendant's properties worthless, de17. 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904). The Madison court demonstrates the approach

to air pollution cases that was most frequently taken by courts. See Holman v. Athens
Empire Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207 (1919); Union Planter's Bank & Trust Co.
v. Memphis Hotel Co., 124 Tenn. 649, 139 S.W. 715 (1911); Duncan v. Hayes, 22 N.J. Eq.

25 (1871). The Madison result favored the dynamic, high-yield interests of industrial business venture over the static interests of individual dwelling units. This outcome - in fact
an economic decision by the courts to shield successful producers - was usually justified
on the ground that defendant's right to use his land enjoyed priority, because production
was viewed as a self-evident value. One Michigan court expressed this hierarchy of values

when it denied a plaintiff equitable relief from the "soot and cinders" generated by defendant's steam engine:
[11f the decision shall be adverse to [the defendants], the loss in the breaking up of
their business, and the depreciation of machinery . . . must be very considerable. . . . The greater and more general interest must be regarded rather than the

inferior and special.
Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448 (1871).
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stroy almost one-half of the county tax base, and cause 10,000
people to leave their homes in search of employment. In Hulbert
5 on the other hand, a
v. California Portland Cement Company,"
1911 California court enjoined the operation of an $800,000 cement
plant. The court took this strong action in spite of the defendant's
claim that (1) he was doing all that could be done to prevent dust
from being discharged into the air, and (2) that his cement plant
provided a large payroll and hence benefitted the community.
The law of nuisance supplied one definition of the dividing line
between the rights of one owner to use his property as he so desired, and the recognition of that right in another. Exactly where

that line was to be drawn was ultimately a decision for the judge,
and a function of the prevailing social and economic attitudes in
his jurisdiction.
III.

THE WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT AND THE CITIZEN-

PLAINTIFF: THE CHANGING COURSE OF JUDICIAL POLICY
REGARDING THE AIR POLLUTION PROBLEM

Between 1872 and 1970 the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided
a number of cases that had been originally brought by citizens
18. 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928, 930 (1911). The Hulbert court justified its decision to grant
injuctive relief in part because:
To permit the cement company to continue its operations even to the extent of
destroying the property of the two plaintiffs and requiring the payment of the full
value thereof would be, in effect, allowing the seizure of private property for a use
other than a public one - something unheard of and totally unauthorized in the law.
The Hulbert position was particularly popular in California. In the case of Tuebner v.
California St. Ry. Co., 66 Cal. 171, 174, 4 P. 1162, 1164 (1884), involving a private
nuisance, the court quoted with approval from Cooley on Torts:
If the smoke or dust, or both, that arises from one man's premises and passes over
and upon those of another, cause perceptible injury to the property, . . . it is a
nuisance. But the inconvenience must be something more than fancy, mere delicacy
or fastidiousness; it must be an inconvenience materially interfering with ordinary
comfort ...
Other California air pollution cases, such as Judson v. L. A. Suburban Gas Co., 157
Cal. 168, 106 P. 581 (1910) and Dauberman v. Grant, 198 Cal. 586, 246 P. 319 (1926),
expanded the nuisance concept such that discomfort, inconvenience, and annoyance to the
public were sufficient to ground a nuisance action, even when no impairment to health was
shown.
Private party plaintiffs also succeeded in their nuisance actions against air polluters in
Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Spangler, 86 Md. 562, 39 A. 270 (1898) [use of the most
approved appliance and methods of production do not justify the continuance of a smoke
nuisance]; Evans v. Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. St. 223, 28 A. 702 (1894); Sullivan v. Roger,
72 Cal. 248, 13 P. 655 (1887) [companies using gas subject to the rulesicutere tuout allenum
non laedas]; and Terre Haute Gas Co. v. Teel, 20 Ind. 131 (1863).
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against private and public air polluters. Although these decisions
were limited in number and somewhat episodic in appearance, they
nevertheless reveal the course of judge-made public policy regarding air pollution. The decisions show three major periods of policy
development in the air pollution area. First, between 1872 and
1900, the supreme court tended to favor those whose pollution was
incident to producing goods for market. Complaining pollution
receptors who merely wished to take a consumer's enjoyment out
of their land generally saw their claims defeated in court. Second,
roughly between 1900 and 1923 the court changed its policy and
began to grant judicial relief to landowners injured by those who
created air pollution in the process of producing goods. Third,
between 1948 and 1969 the court struck down nearly all defenses
that had been raised by polluters in past litigation and continued
to favor the interests of pollution receptors over market-oriented
activities that caused air pollution. A major shift in policy thus
occurred after the turn of the century. Before 1900 the court generally protected the interests of active producers for market from the
claims of relatively passive pollution receptors who did not use
their land to produce goods, but who simply desired a consumer's
enjoyment of their homes. After 1900, though, the court's preference for market-oriented activities gave way to consumer values,
and the court began to protect plaintiffs' interests. By 1969, this
judicial favor for pollution receptors had been considerably
strengthened by a number of post-World War II decisions.
Of course, these three time periods are not exact and only serve
to point out the years during which the above policy trends were
most prevalent. In fact, within each policy period, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court not only articulated inconsistent policies, it also
advanced the main policy trend along several different lines. For
example, between 1872 and 1900 the main effect of air pollution
cases was to deny relief to receptors who wished either to enjoin
or to secure damages from pollution producers. But during these
eighteen years the court also announced several decisions which
formed the basis for judicial protection of pollution receptors after
1900. And during this same eighteen-year time period, while the
court primarily advanced the interests of market-oriented polluters, it did not do so by blindly favoring those who produced goods.
The court also expressed a preference for defendant-polluters when
the polluter provided a diffuse service function for the community
at large, or when the plaintiff attempted to raise a more general

480
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public damage as part of his claim. Similarly, in the second policy
period, between 1900 and 1923, a few of the court's decisions
favored market-directed polluter interests and hence were more
consistent with decisions of the earlier pre-1900 period. Air pollution cases between 1900 and 1923 did not just mark a preference
for injured pollution receptors: these cases also reveal a gradual
judicial acceptance of the notion that an injured plaintiff could
raise (and a court should consider) the interests of others damaged
by pollution.
Consider a tabulation of these air pollution cases, grouped first
according to policy period, second according to subsidiary policy
development within each period, and then by case name, date,
complainant's interest, defendant's offending activity, and ultimate
court disposition:

19751

AIR POLLUTION POLICY

=o

oj

c:
0

.---..

0

.V:

,

c

2o

23

-

-

.2 a 4. .2

-

.202

Cb(too

t00

E

~00

E

'>

b

E° E
C.)

o._.. to.

.103

.0c W..

00

-.4
C.)3

E

0

-. 0

0

o

- - - - - - -

C-

5-

8

CI(U

0

~

CC.-

p

CI

0

0

(

*~

8

C
C~5

5

3

'.

(U

0

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

o

bo

to

on

.-

000
.0

CI
00

223

0-

-

Br--

0

-----

CU

C"

S4
C.CU

b

>
0c

C

to
-

Ci

0

[Vol. 58

1975]

AIR POLLUTION POLICY

0
0

c

22:
0'

0 0

M
cdd

--

to U)

u~C

0.

Ar

-

0onCn"

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

These tables reveal two important facts about judicial responses to air pollution in Wisconsin. First, the ultimate court outcome
did not depend on whether the plaintiff sought to enjoin the
polluter-defendant's activities, or whether the plaintiff was content
with damages. Before Period II, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
believed that damages or court-enforced injunction would pose too
much hardship for polluters operating in the market. Therefore, to
protect market-producers from both equitable and legal penalties,
the court favored the interests of polluters over pollution receptors.
But by Period II, after the court decided that homeowners suffering from pollution had an important interest to protect, the court
was willing both to enjoin and to order damages against air polluters.
Second, to a large extent the interests raised by plaintiffs and
defendants fell into fairly consistent patterns between 1872 and
1969. Defendants were polluters who either produced goods for
market or provided services to the community-at-large. The plaintiff was typically a "homeowner" who alleged in his complaint that
defendant's emissions had lessened the economic value of his residence or otherwise damaged both real and personal property and
injured the health and comfort of plaintiff and his family. In this
role, most plaintiffs merely raised consumer values, the desire of
a landowner to secure personal enjoyment of his property. Occasionally the plaintiff either produced goods for market (the
plaintiff-farmer) or provided services (the plaintiff-motel owner).
In such cases the plaintiffs market-oriented activity was so highly
focused and minor compared to defendant's more broad-reaching
operation, that the court typically treated the plaintiff as though
he too were merely raising consumer values. Moreover, even when
a plaintiff claimed that a defendant's pollution had impeded plaintiff's ability to produce goods or services, the plaintiff would also
usually allege that certain consumer values (health, value of his
residence) had been injured as well.
A. Period I
I. Judicial Favor for and Protection of Polluters Who Produced
Goods and Services for Market
Judicial favor for those who used land for market production
was given legislative legitimacy twenty-three years before the Wisconsin Supreme Court ever addressed an air pollution issue. One
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act of the state's first legislature was to create a cause of action
for private nuisance; Chapter 110 of the Revised Statutes of 1849
provided that Wisconsin courts had jurisdiction over private nuisance actions and gave the courts the power to enforce judgments
for the plaintiff requiring the nuisance to be abated. But, fearing
that unchecked initiation of nuisance lawsuits might deter or
impede the growth of productive enterprise, the legislature soon
amended this original nuisance statute to declare that "nuisances
shall be abated and removed, unless the court. . . shall certify the
abatement is unnecessary." 9 Legislators realized that some nuisances (e.g. the smoke billowing out of a manufacturing plant) were
natural products of a growing state economy, and thought that
judges should at least have the discretion, in the appropriate case,
to protect the nuisance-producing operation from total elimination.
Wisconsin's first air pollution case, Slight v. Gutzlaff,21 decided
in 1874, reflected this ranking of values. The plaintiff, asserting his
interest as the owner of a residence, alleged that smoke and cinders
from the defendant's lime-kiln had diffused themselves through his
premises, to his great annoyance. 21 After the plaintiff won a verdict
for nominal damages of twenty-five cents, the defendant appealed.
On appeal the defendant argued that he did not erect or own the
kilns but had only been using and renting them. The plaintiff
countered this argument by asserting that it was the use of the
kilns, not just the kilns themselves, that made them a nuisance.
Had the plaintiff won, those who merely operated nuisanceproducing activities would have been liable for damages. But the
Wisconsin Supreme Court was not willing to put such restrictions
on lessees who managed property for market production. The
court rejected the plaintiff's "ingenious argument that it is not the
structure, but the use only, which constitutes the nuisance; and that
every new act is an original nuisance."22 Judgment was reversed
and the plaintiff was left without any measure of relief.
In McCann v. Strang=. a homeowner sought to enjoin the
operation of an electric light plant on the ground that while gener19. See S.B. 135 (1849). Legislators did not undertake to define the substantive law of
nuisance, but in effect incorporated general judge-made law on the subject.
20. 35 Wis. 675 (1874).
21. Id. at 675.
22. Id. at 678.
23. 97 Wis. 551, 72 N.W. 1117 (1897).
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ating steam power, it burned soft coal whose smoke so filled the
air with noxious vapors, cinders and soot as to render the plaintiff's
home unhealthful.24 In the Slight case the defendant had produced
goods; in McCann the defendant provided an essential public service. In both these cases the plaintiffs, on the other hand, represented ultimate consumer interests. Though the plaintiff in
McCann introduced evidence that the rental value of his land had
declined since the smoke emissions began, both the trial and supreme court erected a stiff standard of damages to protect the
defendant-power plant from the plaintiffs lawsuit. Said the supreme court in McCann, ". . . [T]he acts complained of did not
"I'
cause any material discomfort or injury to plaintiffs ...
While loss of rental value was damage measurable in moneymarket terms, the court required a stronger showing of pollutioncaused injury before it would enjoin the conduct of so necessary
an enterprise as an electrical power generating plant.
Three years later, in 1900, the supreme court again faced a
situation where a pollution receptor raised his interest as a homeowner and consumer in an attempt to enjoin the pollutionproducing actions of a market actor. In Tiede v. Schneidt,21 a
homeowner sought to enjoin and secure damages from a nearby
rendering plant owner. But as in the Slight and McCann cases, the
court applied ordinary rules of litigation to favor the interests of
the defendant-market producer. In Tiede, the supreme court upheld lower court rulings favorable to the polluter on the grounds
that appellate courts should not interfere with the discretion of trial
judges. As Chief Justice Cassoday stated: "Were we sitting as a
trial court, some of us might be inclined to hold that the preponderance of the evidence is in favor of the plaintiff. But the trial court
had far better opportunity for weighing the evidence and ascertaining the truth than we have."' 27 In Clark v. Wambold,18 the court
again indicated a preference for a market-oriented activity (defendant raised pigs for market) over a pollution receptor's consumer
24. Id. at 552, 72 N.W. at 1117.
25. Id. at 854, 72 N.W. at 1118.
26. 105 Wis. 470, 81 N.W. 826 (1900). See also Tiede v. Schneidt, 99 Wis. 201, 75 N.W.
798 (1898). In the first Tiede case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin sustained the trial

court's refusal to enjoin the rendering plant on the grounds that such a decision was within
the discretion of the trial court, not of an appellate court.

27. Id. at 479, 81 N.W. at 829.
28. 165 Wis. 70, 160 N.W. 1039 (1917). The court here appealed to the defendant to
remove the pigs on the basis of "good neighborliness."
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value as a homeowner who claimed he could not enjoy his property
with the odor in the air. Applying the strict standard of damages
proof set forth in McCann, the court in Clark held that the plaintiff
had not satisfied the requisite degree of tangible or specific harm.
"... [T]he fact that odors are carried abroad on a summer breeze
will not make an actionable nuisance. It becomes one of those
minor discomforts of life which must be borne in deference to the
principle that one man's
enjoyment of property cannot always be
' 2
the controlling factor.
The lesson of these four Period I cases is relatively simple:
When the supreme court was faced with two contending interests,
one of which involved market activity and the other the enjoyment
of an ultimate consumer, the court was apt to apply routine rules
of litigation to favor the market interest.
2.

Favor for Defendant's Diffuse Service Function
Another rationale used by courts to favor market-production
polluters can be found in those early air pollution cases where the
defendant-polluter was not only one who supplied goods and services for market, but also one whose activities affected a broader
reach of other interests. In these cases, where the defendant was
either a transport enterprise or a local government performing a
diffuse public service function, the Wisconsin Supreme Court generally insulated these defendants from plaintiff's lawsuit. The implicit reason for the court's refusal to grant relief was that both
transport entities and local government performed functions of
general, diffuse benefit to the community as a whole and, hence,
should be given a value priority. Cities and transport entities were
entitled to a value priority not just when the plaintiff raised a
consumer interest, but also when the plaintiff was a productive part
of the market economy.
For example, in Spaulding v. The Chicago and Northwestern
Railway Company,3 the plaintiff was a farmer who sought to
recover damages from a railroad company. The plaintiff alleged
that sparks escaping from one of defendant's railroad engines had
ignited dry vegetation and woodlands on plaintiff's property. Chief
Justice Dixon recognized that the railroad was merely bound to a
"reasonable man" standard in the management and care of their
29. Id. at 72, 160 N.W. at 1040.
30. 30 Wis. 110 (1872).
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engines and accorded the railroad no higher duty. 3' Two years
later, in Read v. Morse,32 a mill owner sought damages from a
polluter on the basis that his mill had been set on fire by sparks
emitted from the defendant's tug boat smoke stack. Again, here
was a situation where both plaintiff and defendant were components of the market economy. But since defendant's tug boat
served a broader range of market interests than plaintiff's mill, the
plaintiff's claim for damages relief was denied. Citing Spaulding
as precedent, the supreme court reversed a trial court judgment for
the plaintiff.
This favor for the perceived importance of transport enterprises
carried over into the twentieth century. Whenever a pollution receptor sued a polluter who helped move goods to market, the
supreme court was likely to protect the interests of the polluter.
The court believed that transport companies operated under hazard of greater cumulative liabilities than enterprises of fixed location because transport entities affected a broader reach of other
interests. Therefore, the court was willing to use the law in order
to except those who assisted the flow of commerce from the ordinary strictures of nuisance law. Thus in Dolan v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co.,3 3 the supreme court refused to
grant relief to a homeowner who sought to recover damages and
to secure abatement of a railroad's smoke nuisance. Although the
court acknowledged that it was a matter of common knowledge
that "offensive smoke inevitably comes from railroad yards," it
nevertheless held that: "Such annoyances resulting from the operation of the railroad must be borne. . . .Such injury, like many
others, is simply one of the penalties we have to pay for the conveniences of modern methods of transportation." 3 4
In Wasilewski v. Biedrzycki,35 a motel owner attempted to halt
the construction of an adjoining car and truck garage. Plaintiff was
concerned that thb garage would'fill with poisonous exhaust fumes
which might cause injury to his motel guests. The court displayed
31. Id. at 121.
32. 34 Wis. 315 (1874).
33. Dolan v. Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry., 118 Wis. 362, 95 N.W. 385 (1903). The Dolan
decision also turned on the court's recognition of the primitive state of anti-pollution technology. Since the court mentioned in its opinion that "the skill of man has not yet devised
means by which these disagreeable results can be avoided," the court obviously saw no
feasible way for defendants to curb their air pollution short of going out of business.

341 Id. at 365, 95 N.W. at 386.
35. 180 Wis. 633, 192 N.W. 989 (1923).
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preference for transport systems and unfounded faith in the atmosphere's dispersal capacity, as well as lack of knowledge about the
cumulative effects of poisonous auto emissions. It found for the
defendant and upheld the trial court holding that the operation of
autos and trucks in garages will give off carbon monoxide, but that
carbon monoxide will be diffused with outer air, rendering it harmless to those nearby.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court arrived at the same result (favor
for polluter over pollution receptor) and for the same reason (polluter served a broader range of interests than pollution receptor)
when private litigants brought actions against local government
maintaining a pollution-prone operation. In most of these cases the
local government owned and operated a municipal sewage treatment plant. Nearby residents complained that the sewage gave off
foul odors or emitted particulate debris. But when these complaints
ripened into a lawsuit that reached the supreme court, the court
inevitably struck down the pollution receptor's plea for relief. Cities had official responsibility to serve diffuse interests. The court
impliedly held in these cases that when the legislature delegated to
a city such diffuse-benefit functions as maintaining a sewage treatment plant, these delegations denied standing to specialized private
interests (for example, the interest raised by a homeowner) to interfere with the city service. As in the transportation cases, the defendant was typically an admitted air polluter. Since the defendant
supplied an essential service of general diffused impact to the community, however, the defendant's position was generally favored in
court.
So, in State ex rel. Hartungv. City of Milwaukee,37 a member
of a village board of health sought leave from the court to prosecute an action enjoining the City of Milwaukee from depositing
garbage near the village limits. The court refused to grant the
plaintiff standing to sue the city. In Folk, Administratorv. City
of Milwaukee,3 an action was brought against a city for negligently allowing a school's sewage system to become clogged. The
resultant sewer gas had escaped into the school and been responsible for the death of one pupil. The Folk court sustained a general
demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint, ruling that a municipal cor36. Id. at 636, 192 N.W. at 990.
37. 102 Wis. 509, 78 N.W. 756 (1899).
38. 108 Wis. 359, 84 N.W. 420 (1900). Note, Wisconsin's ChangingRole of Municipal
Liability for Negligence and Nuisance, 27 MARQ. L. REV. 141 (1943).
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poration was not liable for injuries resulting from nuisanceproducing acts of its officers. When a taxpayer sought to restrain
a city from purchasing a tract of land just outside city limits to
manufacture crushed rock for city road-building purposes, the
court in Schneider v. City of Menasha39 acted to aid the city's
diffuse service function by denying the injunction. Even when the
court upheld the granting of equitable relief to a pollution receptor,
the court often qualified the language of its opinion if an essential
city service was responsible for the air pollution nuisance. While
the court in Winchell v. City of Waukesha4 required that a city
deodorize its sewage after a citizen complained of the stench it gave
off in warm weather, Justice Dodge could not help but observing:
"[A]s the density of our population increases, as our citizens engage in new and greater industries, and as the municipal aggregations of population multiply, the original purity of the environment
'4
cannot be wholly preserved. " '
Disfavor for Plaintiffs Who Raise the Interest of Others
The Hartung4 case points up another secondary policy trend
that emerged during Period I. In Hartung, the plaintiff originally
requested the state attorney general to enjoin the City of Milwaukee from depositing untreated garbage near the plaintiff's community. After the attorney general refused, the plaintiff sought
leave from the court to prosecute in equity on behalf of all those
affected by the garbage. The supreme court refused to permit such
an action. The nuisance was a public one, and public nuisance
actions could "not be maintained by a private party on behalf of
the public without the presence of a proper law officer [unless]
private rights [were] invaded and [there was] special and peculiar
injury to plaintiff. ' 43 In Hartung, and other early air pollution
cases, the court adhered to the notion that judicial power was
inherently limited to situations which presented a traditionally focused case or controversy. Class actions, or actions brought on
behalf of an affected class, were deemed socially undesirable because they might strain the structural limits of courts. Nineteenth
century judges were accustomed to litigating cases between two
3.

39. 118 Wis. 298, 95 N.W. 94 (1903).
40. 110 Wis. 101, 85 N.W. 668 (1901).
41. Id. at 107, 85 N.W. at 670.

42. See note 37, supra.
43. Id.

1975]

AIR POLLUTION POLICY

parties and, hence, were apt to refuse recognition to a plaintiff
claiming a general public damage unless the plaintiff also showed
special harm peculiar to himself.
Disfavor for class-type suits was evidenced in the court's strict
interpretation of the private-public nuisance distinction. Plaintiffs
who were not injured more so than other pollution receptors living
nearby often lost in courts on the basis that they were not the
proper parties to bring a public nuisance action. One of Wisconsin's earliest pollution cases, Greene v. Nunnemaher,44 reversed a
lower court decision in favor of the plaintiff in part because although "defendant's stockyards caused an unhealthy condition of
the surrounding atmosphere . . .there can be no action by an
individual for abatement of a common nuisance, unless special
damage is alleged and proven." 45 Four years later the legislature
created section 3180 of the 1878 Revised Statutes. This amendment to the Wisconsin nuisance law gave statutory force to the
special and peculiar damage requirement. Section 3180 gave courts
jurisdiction over "actions to recover damages for and to abate
private nuisance or public nuisances from which any person suffers
a private or specific injury, peculiar to himself, so far as necessary
to protect the rights of such person." Then, in the 1884 case of
Stadler v. Grieben 6 the court not only followed the common law
precedent of Greene and the statutory command of section 3180,
but it also made even more restrictive the "special damage" precondition to public nuisance actions. The Stadler court refused to
grant relief to a pollution receptor who could prove special injury
in fact (diminution of rent), but not of kind (a reduction of rental
value due to defendant's public odor nuisance was not that much
different from similarly-caused rent reductions in neighboring
buildings).
Some general themes emerge from these early Period I cases.
Courts were not effective instruments either for protecting the interests of landowners asserting consumer values or for regulating
the use of the air resource. The judiciary resigned control to other
factors, particularly economic forces. Judges favored legal doctrine
that promoted the maximum of market-organized transactions, in
the confidence that community gross product would grow best
44. 36 Wis. 50 (1874).

45. Id.
46. 61 Wis. 500, 21 N.W. 629 (1884).
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through market exchange processes. Much of the bar and bench
were unwilling to risk slowing economic growth by enjoining or
fining productive air polluters. Here judges were merely reflecting
a predominant ethos of the times which saw no wisdom in placing
on either the polluting enterprise or its customers the full cost of
environmental control.
The fault basis of liability was another judge-made doctrine
that worked against sound judicial resolution of air pollution controversies. Plaintiff-pollution receptors were looking for someone
to blame for their misery, and smoke-spewing factories were the
most obvious culprits. But courts were unwilling to find factory
owners at fault. Given the near total lack of pollution control
techniques available, to find such fault in the factory operation
might spur a large exodus of manufacturing enterprise from Wisconsin. By wedding themselves to the fault doctrine, courts were
in many ways forced to arrive at conclusions they might suspect
were wrong, but for which the doctrine offered no alternative.
Courts were also hampered by lack of information about the
causes, effects, and cure of the air pollution problem. Plaintiff and
defendant litigators usually only supplied a host of witnesses who
reported whether smoke or odors carried over the plaintiff's residence. The only expert witness who commonly appeared at trial
was the real estate appraiser, who estimated whether the plaintiff's
property had diminished in value because of the smoke nuisance.
No significant testimony was ever presented on the market causes
or diffuse effects of air pollution.
Finally, both bench and bar failed to expand or adjust preexisting legal doctrine to fit changing social patterns. Property,
tort, and nuisance law may have been adequate in an earlier and
simpler time when cities were small, factories were non-existent,
and one-to-one relationships were prevalent. But with the advent
of the industrial revolution and the tremendous growth of population during the nineteenth century, old theories no longer fit. The
nineteenth century was a new age of more widespread and more
interlocked interests, and old legal doctrine could no longer adequately adjust the new social relations. For many years judges did
not see this change; they relied on established theories of law. After
all, was not law a complete, given set of principles that only needed
to be applied to varying situations? Nor did the bar act to correct
this assumption. In Wisconsin, other than in Slight v. Gutzlaff4
47. See note 20, supra.
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litigants made little experiment with new theories. Laws and attitudes about the law survived and perpetuated themselves but were
rarely reappraised.
B. Period II
1. Judicial Protection of the Air Resource and Favor for Consumer Values
By the turn of the century, the Wisconsin Supreme Court began
to realize that consistent favor for market-oriented use of the air
resource could not continue indefinitely. By 1900 the sheer number
of air pollution sources had grown so large that the air resource
had become seriously contaminated in certain areas of the state.
Polluting activities, even polluting productive activities, needed to
be checked. The court recognized that it must fashion doctrine to
protect the consumer interests of landowners. Judicial preference
for enterprise that produced goods for a broad market might have
seemed justifiable when market-productive air polluters were few
in number, and instances of air pollution were episodic in frequency. But with sources of air pollution appearing everywhere,
and with a large number of pollution receptors clamoring for some
form of judicial relief, the court saw a need to change its policy.
This evolution of air pollution policy really began in 1883 with
the landmark decision of Pennoyer v. Allen.48 Pennoyer was the
first Wisconsin Supreme Court case which favored the interests of
pollution receptors over productive polluters, and it was to become
the basis for judicial resolution of nearly all subsequent air pollution controversies. The case was not only extensively cited well into
the twentieth century by plaintiffs, defendants, and appellate
courts in Wisconsin, it was also a leading case in other jurisdictions. Pennoyer was a classic nuisance case. The plaintiff was a
homeowner whose damaged interest was mainly that of being deprived of the use and enjoyment of his residence. He sought compensatory damages and an injunction against the defendant's tannery. The plaintiff based his claim on the allegation that the defendant's tanning business caused noxious vapors, offensive odors,
and smoke and soot to invade the premises and have tainted and
corrupted the atmosphere, and thereby rendered the plaintiffs
buildings unfit for habitation.49 The defendant answered that not
48. 56 Wis. 502, 6 N.W. 887 (1883).
49. Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

only had it operated the tannery for twenty years before the action
was filed, but that it had thereby acquired an absolute right to send
odors, smoke and soot over the plaintiff's premises. After a parade
of witnesses by both sides, the judge charged the jury on the test
of a nuisance: "If a business is conducted with such care as usually
obtains in the management of similar enterprises, then the citizen
has no ground for complaint." 5 The jury's special verdict found
that the defendants had not interfered with the plaintiff's enjoyment of his property, and that the plaintiff had not been injured in
any way by the defendant.
On appeal the plaintiff argued that the trial court's "usual
care" standard for nuisance was an incorrect interpretation of nuisance law. According to the plaintiff, a nuisance was necessarily
present in the Pennoyersituation because of smoke and soot damage caused by the tannery, and because twenty-three witnesses
testified to the presence of the "corrupted" atmosphere about the
plaintiff's premises. The tannery owner countered this argument by
warning the supreme court, "[i]f sending vapor and smoke upon
the neighboring premises is a nuisance, then every manufacturing
establishment, every house with a chimney, is a nuisance.""'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court was unimpressed with the defendant's stance. The court invoked Walter v. Selfe, 52 an ancient
English case where vice-chancellor Knight Bruce had held that
parties "were entitled to an untainted and unpolluted stream of air
for the necessary supply and reasonable use of himself and his
family. . . ."51 On this basis the court reversed and found for
Pennoyer. At first the court qualified its decision. In language that
was later used by a host of polluter-defendants, Justice Cassoday
conceded that: (1) "the law is not so rigid as to make every business
which imparts any degree of impurity to the atmosphere a nuisance, ' 5 (2) "the maintenance of life, especially in crowded cities,
necessitates the imparting of a certain degree of impurity to the
atmosphere," 55 and (3) "title to land gives to the owner the right
to impregnate the air upon and over the same with such smoke...
as he desires. .... -5
50. Id.

51. Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.

4 De G. & S., 315.
56 Wis. 502, 507, 14 N.W. 609, 611 (1888).
Id. at 510-11, 14 N.W. at 613.
Id. at 511, 14 N.W. at 613.

56. Id.
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However, continued Justice Cassoday, landowners cannot legally "contaminate the atmosphere to such an extent as to substantially interfere with the comfort or enjoyment of others, or impair
the use of their property." 57 Because air is movable it necessarily
flows onto adjacent premises. This being so, it followed that "any
business which necessarily and constantly impregnates large volumes -of the atmosphere . . . may become a nuisance to those
occupying adjacent property. . . .. To be a nuisance the injury
"1

complained of must be substantial and tangible and capable of
discomforting "the senses of ordinary people." And most important, it was not a defense that the business may have been conducted in a reasonable and proper manner. Concluded the court,
"the [defendant's] business is lawful; but such interruption and
destruction is an invasion of private rights, and to that extent
unlawful." 59
From the Pennoyer decision a three-point standard thus
evolved for resolution of air pollution cases. Courts would favor
homeowner or consumer values over the interests of those actively
producing goods or services for market when three conditions were
present: (1) the market actor's activity polluted the air over the
homeowner's land; (2) this air pollution either interfered with the
plaintiff's personal comfort or impaired the plaintiff's use of his
property; (3) this discomfort or interference was substantial and
tangible. When these three conditions were met, it would be no
defense that the market actor's business was lawful, or that it was
conducted in a reasonable manner. A reasonable care standard was
suitable to ordinary negligence actions. But the continuous nature
of an air pollution nuisance, especially one imparting substantial
injury, allowed the court to disallow as a defense the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct.
It was not until eleven years after Pennoyer, in the 1894 case
of Price v. Oakfield Highland Creamery Co.,"0 that the court again
agreed to enjoin the operations of a market-oriented air polluter.
In Price, the court ordered abatement of a creamery's emissions
on the grounds that a nearby resident had suffered considerable
57. Id.
58. Id. at 512, 14 N.W. at 613.
59. Id.
60. 87 Wis. 537, 58 N.W. 1039 (1894). In this case the court recommended that the
defendant be perpetually enjoined from polluting because "the invasion of the plaintiff's
premises with an offensive foreign substance [was] by means of artificial appliances." Id.
at 541.
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personal and property damage from the defendant's smoke.
Pennoyer and Price were the only two nineteenth century cases
which so favored the consumer interests of air pollution receptors.
Nevertheless, these decisions foreshadowed twentieth century policy. For example, after both the Pennoyer and Price courts used
the judiciary's equity powers to restrain the air polluting activities
of market actors, the legislature decided to incorporate this judgemade doctrine into the state's nuisance statute. In 1898 the legislature amended the Wisconsin nuisance statute to read:
An action can be maintained and an injunction issued when the
nuisance may work an irreparable injury, interminable litigation,
• . . or the injury is continuous and constantly recurring, [and
therefore] not susceptible of adequate compensation in damages
at law. "
After 1900 the Pennoyer standard was completely controlling
in air pollution cases. In Rogers v. John Week Lumber Company,62
the court concluded that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action
in nuisance when the complaint alleged that the defendant's operation emitted "immense amounts of steam, dust, dirt, and
smoke"63 likely to cause material, physical discomfort to a person
of ordinary sensibilities. In Holman v. Mineral Point Zinc
Company, 4 the court specifically relied upon the Pennoyer decision to overrule a demurrer to the plaintiff's nuisance complaint.
The defendant's sulfuric acid plant emitted noxious fumes which
carried over Holman's property. The court concluded that "an
industry. . . may be conducted in such a manner or in such a place
61. See Wis. REv. STAT. (1898), ch. 137, § 3180. It is interesting to note that one year
before the Pennoyer court enjoined defendant's tannery from polluting the air over the
plaintiff's land, the legislature amended sec. 3180 to give courts jurisdiction to abate nuisances "in equity before action brought in law." See Wis. REV. STAT. (1882), ch. 190.
62. 117 Wis. 5, 93 N.W. 821 (1903).
63. Id. at 7, 93 N.W. at 822.
64. 135 Wis. 132, 115 N.W. 327 (1908). The plaintiff's complaint in Holman alleged
that defendant's plant "smoke and coal fumes" which "caused annoyance, rendered possession of the property dangerous to health, and in fact destroyed apple and cherry trees."
Plaintiff claimed that he was unable to sell the premises, and that its rental value had
diminished by eight dollars a month. On appeal the defendant admitted that the "two things
essential to prosperity are useful trades and healthful dwellings, [but] these two interests
are in constant conflict as structures for habitation and trade cannot be remote from each
other." Defendant then went on to argue that the complaint failed because the plaintiff never
pleaded that the defendant was the proximate cause of injury. The gist of plaintiff's brief
was a five page full quotation of the Pennoyerdecision.
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as to be a nuisance."6 Pennoyerwas followed in non-air pollution
nuisance cases, too. In 1896, in Middlestadt v. Waupaca Starch
and Potato Company," the supreme court agreed to restrain the
defendant from throwing into the Waupaca River refuse matter
from its starch factory. Citing Pennoyer v. Allen and two other air
pollution cases decided earlier by the court, Justice Marshall
wrote:
Anything done which so pollutes water

. . .

as to injuriously

affect the beneficial enjoyment of adjoining property, may be
restrained at the suit of the injured party; and difficulty in avoiding the trouble [cannot] justify or excuse the wrong."
Once the court agreed to favor the interests of pollution receptors who simply wished to take a consumer's enjoyment out of
their land, it became easier for the court to be more receptive to
those pollution receptors who wished to raise the interests of others
in their lawsuit. In Stadler v. Grieben, s Green v. Nunnemacher,9
and Hartung v. City of Milwaukee," the nineteenth century court
had invoked the "special damage" pre-condition to public nuisance
suits to defeat the claims of plaintiffs who were not injured any
more so than other pollution receptors living nearby. Special damage was required because the court believed that a private suitor
was not a proper party to raise the interests of all others affected
by air pollution. But, in 1905, the state legislature decided that
citizen-plaintiffs should be able to activate the judicial process on
behalf of the public-at-large. In that year the legislature added
section 3180a to its nuisance statute. This section gave jurisdiction
to courts to enjoin public nuisances in suits "commenced and prosecuted, in the name of the state,.

. . upon

the relation of a private

individual having first obtained leave from said court." Before
1905 only private suitors who could show special damage might sue
against public nuisances. Now section 3180a assured standing to
private pollution receptors who sought to act for the public benefit.
2.

Permission to Raise the Interests of Others
The Wisconsin Supreme Court followed the dictates of section
65. Id. at 136, 115 N.W. at 329.
66. 93 Wis. 1, 66 N.W. 713 (1896).

67. Id. at 4, 66 N.W. 714.
68. See note 44, supra.
69. See note 42, supra.

70. See note 35, supra.
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3180a and in subsequent air pollution decisions reversed its policy
against class-type suits. In the 1920 case of Anstee v. Monroe
Light and Fuel Company," the court upheld a lower court decision
which had ordered the discontinuance of the defendant's smoke
nuisance. A dictum in the Anstee opinion broadened the potential
class of plaintiffs who might seek similar judicial relief: "It is not
essential that plaintiff alone be affected by the nuisance. It is sufficient that he belongs to a class specially affected by it ... .
While Anstee was not an action by plaintiff for a class of likesituated persons, the court at least had no objection to the fact that
the plaintiff was in the same position as others. In the 1922 case
of Cunningham v. Miller, 3 the court agreed to enjoin an undertaking parlor whose operation was likely to produce offensive
emissions. The successful plaintiff in Cunningham had only suffered damage to consumer values not special to him, but he was
able to bolster his claim by raising the homedweller interests of his
similarly-situated neighbors. Even on those occasions when the
supreme court refused to enjoin air pollution activities, the court
used a standard which considered the interests of all possible pollution receptors, not just those of the plaintiff. So, in Wergin v.
Voss, 74 the court upheld a trial court that refused to enjoin the
construction of a polluting business, ruling that the injury apprehended is not of such an offensive character as to do actual damages either to plaintiff or his neighbors. 75
C. Period III
1. Consistent Favor for the Consumer-Oriented Values of Pollution Receptors: Judicial Elimination of Most Polluter Defenses
After World War II, the supreme court continued its prefer71. 171 Wis. 291, 177 N.W. 26 (1920). The Anstee court did not enjoin the operation
of the polluter's business, but merely ordered discontinuance of the nuisance "after such

time as it might require defendant to make necessary alterations to its smokestack."
72. Id. at 293, 177 N.W. at 26.
73. 178 Wis. 22, 189 N.W. .531 (1922). Justice Eschweiler's dissent in Cunningham
harkened back to the pre-1900 days of Wisconsin nuisance litigation: "That the lawful use
of defendant's property may lessen selling value of plaintiff's property is not a sufficient

basis upon which to grant an injunction." Id. at 31.
74. 179 Wis. 603, 192 N.W. 51 (1923). The Wergin result was different from that in
Cunningham in part because a different result had been reached at the trial level, and the
supreme court did not wish to interfere with the lower court's discretion. This was similar
to the reasoning in Tiede v. Schneidt, 105 Wis. 470, 81 N.W. 826 (1900), note 24, supra.

75. Id.
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ence for the relatively static homedweller interests of pollution
receptors over active, productive, polluting components of the
market economy. The court had decided that air pollution was a
harm-producing nuisance and was willing to enlist judicial power
in order to prevent these nuisances from recurring. Consistent legal
protection of consumer values injured by air pollution was more
evident in the Wisconsin Supreme Court than in other state legal
institutions. Neither the legislative nor executive branches, in both
state and local government, wanted to place strong legal constraints on polluters who produced goods and services for market.
The supreme court, on the other hand, was not only willing to
restrain air polluters, it also wished to limit the number of defenses
that could be raised by polluters in a litigation context. Since all
the air pollution cases decided by the court after 1948 expressed
the same value preference for consumer interests over marketproduction, these Period III cases are mainly significant for demonstrating judicial desire to reduce acceptable excuses for air pollution. By so narrowing the permissible limits of pollution-prone
behavior, the court was thereby broadening the right of potential
receptors to a pollution-free airspace.
Two defenses which had been successfully invoked by polluters
in the past were (1) that "users" of polluting operations could not
be held liable for any damage caused, and (2) that cities performing
functions of general, diffuse benefit to the community should be
given a value priority over specialized private interests somehow
harmed by the city's activity. Both these defenses were judicially
rejected in Period III. In Kamke v. Clark and others: PabstBrewing Co., 71a private citizen brought an action to abate an air pollution nuisance allegedly maintained by the Pabst Brewing Company. The defendant claimed that it was not the owner of the
polluting plant, but merely its chief "user," and that under the
Wisconsin rule of Slight v. Gutzlaffll the user could not be held
liable for nuisances allowed by the owner. In Kamke, decided in
1955, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that since the nuisance
was a "continuing" one, and since the user of the plant knew he
was maintaining a nuisance, plaintiff could enjoin the operation of
the plant and recover damages from the user. The Slight rule was
thereby effectively overruled, and operators of polluting industries
76. 268 Wis. 465, 67 N.W.2d 841 (1955).
77. See note 18, supra.
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were put on notice that they could be liable for damages. By broadening liability so as to include both owner and operator of a polluting enterprise, the court no doubt meant to impose on a broader
class of pollution producers an affirmative duty to abate emissions.
And in fixing responsibility for pollution further down the chain
of command, the court may also have been trying to precipitate
abatement action from day-to-day operators, who after all would
be the first to know if a plant had an air pollution problem.
In the 1964 case of Costas v. City of Fond du Lac,7" the plaintiff
was a restaurant, motel, and movie theatre owner who wished to
enjoin a defendant-city from permitting gases to emanate from its
sewage-disposal plant. A number of nineteenth century cases had
implicitly held that the private citizen could not enjoin cities performing such diffuse benefit functions as sewage treatment. In
other words, it appeared that because of the broad range of benefits
that only cities could supply, municipally owned and operated
sources of pollution were a special class of polluter defendant. But
the Costas court attacked "the attitude that the city, because it is
a city, is not subject to the law." 79 The supreme court found that
the plaintiff was substantially injured in the use and enjoyment of
his property and then upheld a lower court order enjoining the city
absolutely from permitting gases to escape from its sewagedisposal plant. While the court still wished to encourage the city's
diffuse benefit function, it also realized that cities, more so than
privately-owned pollution nuisances, possessed the financial means
to abate the pollution these service functions occasionally engendered. Therefore, the court reasoned, cities could and should be
affirmatively ordered to eliminate pollution nuisances, even if the
nature of the order was coercive.8"
While the Kamke and Costas decisions overturned previous
judge-made policy, the important 1948 decision of Dolata v. Berthelet Fuel and Supply Company81 struck down a number of defenses that had rarely been raised before in Wisconsin. The Dolata
plaintiff was a private citizen-homeowner who brought a private
nuisance action against a coal supply company to enjoin it from
spreading coal dust into the air. After the trial court issued an
injunction, the defendant appealed the lower court decision on four
78.
79.
80.
81.

24 Wis. 2d 409, 129 N.W.2d 217 (1964).
Id. at 417, 129 N.W.2d 221.
Id. at 419, 129 N.W.2d at 222.
254 Wis. 194, 36 N.W.2d 97 (1948).
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grounds: (1) The pollution nuisiance was there before the plaintiff
arrived and hence the plaintiff had "come to" the nuisance and was
barred from enjoining it; (2) The defendant had acquired a prescriptive right to continue the nuisance by his long use of the
airspace as a garbage dump; (3) It was too difficult to determine
what portion of alleged damages were proximately caused by the
defendant; and (4) Defendant's business was in a predominantly
industrialized area of the city.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court disposed of each of these defenses and sustained the trial court. First, the court repudiated the
notion that plaintiffs were barred from recovery if they happened
to locate near a pre-existing nuisance. The court's rejection of the
"coming to the nuisance" defense was quite important in 1948. By
that year there were so many polluters operating in Wisconsin that
it would have been difficult to move or "come to" any of the state's
larger cities without feeling the effects of pollutants emitted by
previously established industry. This ground of the Dolatadecision
was followed ten years later in Rode v. Sealtite Insulation Manufacturing Corp.12 In Rode, the supreme court affirmed a trial court
which had ruled that operation of the defendant's rock wool insulation plant could be enjoined and damages awarded the plaintiff
even though the plaintiff had "come to" the defendant's air pollution nuisance.
The Dolata defendant's second defense, its "prescriptive right"
theory, had been successfully challenged before in Wisconsin. The
defendant in the Pennoyer decision had unsuccessfully raised this
defense, and the supreme court later disposed of it directly in the
1890 case of Meiners v. The Frederick Miller Brewing
Company.A The Meiners court had struck down the contention
that by its continued and adverse use of the atmosphere, a
defendant-polluter could acquire a prescriptive right to maintain a
nuisance. Therefore, that the Dolata court refused to give this
argument any legitimacy in 1948 was not surprising.
What is significant about Dolata is that it sustained the lower
court injunction in the face of conflicting evidence as to which
polluter caused coal dust damage to plaintiff and in the face of
82. 3 Wis. 2d 286, 88 N.W.2d 345 (1958).
83. 78 Wis. 364, 47 N.W. 430 (1890). The plaintiff in the Meiners case attempted to

persuade the supreme court that "the tainting and impregnating of the atmosphere over and
around a public highway is a public nuisance per se." Respondent's brief, p. 18. The court

did not choose to address this interesting contention in its opinion.
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uncontroverted evidence that the defendant was operating its business in an industrial district. The court thus established two important precedents. First, difficulties of linking cause and effect would
no longer necessarily bar injured pollution receptors from recovery. After Dolata, the cause and effect issue would become merely
a question of fact. While plaintiffs would be required to call numerous witnesses and experts at trial to prove the origin of the air
pollution nuisance, the mere fact that a number of nearby polluters
were operating would no longer defeat a plaintiff's claim against
any one of them as a matter of law. Second, after the Dolata
decision industrial conditions surrounding a polluter-defendant
could not be used to justify excessive pollution emissions. Polluters
polluted at their own risk and could not hide within the safety of
an industrial zone. Thus, seventeen years after Dolata, in Bie v.
Ingersoll," the court agreed that the defendant's asphalt plant was
a private nuisance even though the plant was located in an industrial zone permitted by a zoning ordinance. Said the court in
Bie: "property must be used in such way that it will not deprive
others of the use and enjoyment of their property.

' 85

Wisconsin

thereby joined a growing number of states in rejecting the rule of
Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi,6 which had held that nuisance actions could not be brought against non-negligent industries operating within districts permitted by an industrial zoning ordinance. 7
The Dolata,Rode, and Bie decisions were consistent with other
common law nuisance cases decided in other states after World
War II. This judicial favor for the consumer interests raised by
84. 27 Wis. 2d 490, 135 N.W.2d 250 (1965).
85. Id. at 494, 135 N.W.2d at 253.
86. 115 Colo. 106, 169 P.2d 171 (1946).
87. Beusher & Morrison, JudicialZoning Through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis.
L. REV. 440.
In one sense refusal to excuse polluters operating within industrial zones was formal
judicial notice of air pollution's externality-like effects. Pollutants simply did not remain
within one zone. Backhanded judicial notice of air pollution and its effects was becoming
more and more common by the turn of the century. In Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104
Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 738 (1899), reversioners brought an action for waste against the owner of
the life estate. Reversioners claimed that a large Milwaukee house built in 1864 had deteriorated because it had become surrounded by factories and railway tracts. While leaving
ultimate resolution of the waste question to the jury, Justice Winslow agreed that the
factories had caused such "a complete change of surrounding conditions" as to "deprive
the property of its value and usefulness." And in Nelson v. State, 167 Wis. 515, 167 N.W.
807 (1918), the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the validity of a Wisconsin statute (Wis.
STAT. §§ 1636-1915 (1915)) requiring the remodeling of basement tenements because "there
is a consensus of opinion . . . that insufficient light and air are deleterious to health."
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most pollution receptors was one acknowledgment of the increasing number of demands for the air resource. When pollution receptors were few in number and states desired economic growth,
courts were generally quite reluctant to put legal obstacles in the
way of potential employers. But after World War II, pollution
receptors were quite large in number, especially in urban areas, and
industrial polluters no longer seemed as crucial to a state's welfare.
Economic considerations were still of primary importance to the
legislative branch, but to the more insulated judiciary, air pollution
when viewed in the context of a focused lawsuit appeared a legally
preventable evil.
Because other courts recognized the growing threat of the postWorld War II air pollution problem, they, like Wisconsin courts,
threw out most defenses raised by polluter-defendants. For example, it was a New York case, City ofRochester v. CharlotteDocks
Co.,88 which first stated the rationale against the "coming to the
nuisance" rule. Said the Rochester decision: "One cannot erect a
nuisance upon his land adjoining vacant lands owned by another
and thus measurably control the uses to which his neighbor's land
may in the future be subjected." 8 9 Also, with the growth of cities
and the multiplication of industrial plants, more and more cases
arose where there were several contributing sources of pollution.
Most states resolved this problem as the Wisconsin Supreme Court
did in Dolata, finding those responsible for the various contribution to be joint tortfeasors, each liable for the full damage. Also,
as in Dolata, Rode, and Bie, most jurisdictions conditioned such
liberal judicial relief on a showing of physical damage. Inconvenience was not enough to sustain an action to enjoin a common law
nuisance. As the supreme court of Kansas stated in the 1951 case
of Hofstetter v. Myers: "A reasonable amount of dust and smoke
does not necessarily constitute a nuisance even though it may cause
annoyance, and this is particularly true where the dust is occasional
and injury slight."90 Finally, it should be noted that other jurisdictions evolved a common law defense to air pollution actions which,
for some inexplicable reason, was never used by Wisconsin liti88. 114 N.Y. Supp. 2d 37 (1953). The "coming to the nuisance" doctrine was first stated
in Rex v. Cross, 2 C&P 483, 172 Eng. Rep. 219 (1826).

89. Id. at 72-73.
90. 170 Kan. 564, 228 P.2d 522 (1951). But see McIver v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal.
App. 2d 247, 172 P.2d 758 (1946), where physical damage did not need to be shown to enjoin
an air polluter.
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gants. These cases held that polluters could not be held liable when
they were using the best known modern appliances to prevent
smoke and fumes." Wisconsin defendants rarely used this defense,
although many were in fact doing everything they could in the
given state of technology to avoid the cause of the offense.
By the 1960's, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was finally ready
to eliminate one of the most long-held pre-conditions to judicial
relief. From the first of its nineteenth century air pollution cases,
the court had adhered to a stiff standard for proving damages.
Even the Pennoyer decision had conditioned liability on this caveat: "The evidence must establish that large volumes of the atmosphere were impregnated with smoke from defendant's operations so that plaintiffs have suffered material and permanent injury."' 2 But in Sohns v. Jensen, 3 the court relaxed Pennoyer's
"substantial injury" requirement considerably. The Sohns plaintiff
was a homeowner who wished to enjoin the defendant from operating an auto burning yard. Although Sohns could cite no specific
example of smoke-caused damage, the court held that general interference with the use and enjoyment of Sohns' property was
sufficient to ground a cause of action against the nuisance. The
plaintiff had proved that general enjoyment of his property was
disrupted by Jensen's smoke, and this was enough damage for the
court to grant Sohns injunctive relief. This lower standard of damages proof was extended six years later in Boershinger v. Elkay
Enterprises, Inc. 4 In Boerschinger, the plaintiff's complaint was
held to state a cause of action when it merely alleged that defendant's rendering plant could potentially interfere with the general
use of plaintiff's residence.
The Sohns and Boerschinger decisions reflected more than a
new, widespread interest in environmental protection. The 1960's
had experienced increased legislative and administrative interest in
air pollution control, and the judiciary had assumed far less of a
role. Since county and state clean air administrators were dealing
with problems that might otherwise have bred lawsuits, the courts
were essentially freed of the task of managing the air resource. Air
91. Price v. Carey Manufacturing Co., 310 Pa. 557, 165 A. 849 (1933); McCluskey v.
Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 583, cited in People v. Oswald, 116 N.Y. S.2d 50 (1952) - use of most

modern control devices sustained as an affirmative defense.
92. Pennoyer v. Allen, note 46, supra.
93. 11 Wis. 2d 449, 105 N.W.2d 818 (1960).
94. 26 Wis. 2d 102, 145 N.W.2d 108 (1966).
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pollution control administrators regulated emissions on the basis
of scientifically set air pollution standards. The common law nuisance action was an anomaly. Courts could afford to relax the rules
of litigation in air pollution cases because judges knew that the
effect of any citizen-initiated lawsuit was bound to be relatively
insignificant. Thus the Wisconsin Supreme Court could dismantle
its stiff standard of damages proof in Sohns and Boerschinger
without fear of swamping the courts with a flood of litigation.
Potential plaintiffs were relying on administrators to fight their
battles after 1960.
The supreme court was correct in its implicit prediction that
pollution receptors would be both reluctant and unwilling to invoke
the judicial process after the mid-1960's. Despite the loosened
damages proof standard expressed in Sohns and Boerschinger,and
despite the elimination of most polluter defenses in Dolata,Rode,
and Bie, only one citizen-initiated air pollution lawsuit was appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court between 1966 and 1974.
This was the 1969 decision in Jost v. DairylandPower Coop.95 Jost
extended the court's favor for the interests of pollution receptors
further than any other decision since Pennoyer.
The plaintiffs were farmers who lived near the Dairyland Power
Cooperative electric generating plant at Alma. In a trial that produced a record of nearly 900 pages of testimony, the farmers contended that the power plant spewed nearly ninety tons of sulphur
dioxide gas into the atmosphere of the Mississippi River Valley
each day. Under certain atmospheric conditions, they alleged, sulphur dioxide settled on their river bluff farms. They claimed this
gas killed pine trees, caused screens to rust, inhibited the growth
of flowers, turned alfalfa leaves white, and caused damage to apple
trees and wild grape vines. Asserting that the defendant had created a nuisance, the farmers sought damages from the Cooperative
varying from $15,000 to $25,000. After a jury verdict in favor of
the plaintiffs, the power plant appealed on two main grounds.
First, it claimed that liability could not attach to a public utility
95. 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1969). Plaintiffs responded to the Cooperative's
"due care" argument by citing the Wisconsin case of Bell v. Gray-Robinson Construction
Company, 265 Wis. 2d 652, 62 N.W.2d 390 (1954). Bell held that a nuisance does not rest
on the degree of care used. Plaintiffs countered defendant's "economic utility" argument
by citing the venerable Pennoyer v. Allen case.

The comparative injury doctrine had been successfully invoked in French Art Cleaners
v. State Board of Dry Cleaners, 88 Cal. App. 2d 45, 198 P.2d 91 (1948); Guttinger v.
Calaveras Cement Co., 105 Cal. App. 2d 382, 233 P.2d 914 (1951).
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engaged in the operation of an electric energy producing plant
which conformed to the best known engineering design. Second, it
asserted that the economic usefulness of its plant far outweighed
the minor damage claims advanced by the farmers.
The supreme court ruled that the defendant's status as a public
service company was no ground for escaping the responsibility for
air pollution damage. For a unanimous court, Justice Nathan Heffernan first discredited the argument that it should be relieved from
liability because the company conformed to usual standards of
care. Relying on Pennoyer v. Allen, 8 Heffernan noted that to
conform to the industry's standards of care was no defense when
the defendant's conduct produced serious, though broadly diffused,
detriment to others. "Due care does not defeat a claim for nuisance. Nor is freedom from negligence a defense if the consequences
of continued conduct cause substantial injury.""7 Heffernan and
the court likewise disagreed with the defendant's contention that
if the social utility of the offending industry substantially outweighed the gravity of the harm, the plaintiff could not recover
damages."8
The Jost decision marked the court's unambiguous repudiation
of traditional nineteenth century values. Heffernan concluded his
opinion with a value-laden observation: "We know of no rule that
permits those who are engaged in important and desirable enterprises to injure with impunity those who are engaged in lesser
economic enterprises." 9
IV.

PUBLIC AIR RESOURCE PROTECTORS AND THE WISCONSIN

JUDICIARY

For many years the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressed reluctance to hold in favor of public prosecutors who initiated actions
in court to reduce air pollution levels for all of an area's residents.
The court was clearly much more wary of a district attorney's
prosecution of an air polluter than it was of a citizen-initiated
lawsuit. Whereas by 1900 the court had begun to favor the ultimate
consumer interests of citizen-plaintiffs over productive air polluters, it was not until the 1960's that the court consistently affirmed
96. See note 46, supra.
97. 45 Wis. 2d 164, 173, 172 N.W.2d at 651-52.
98. Id. at 174, 172 N.W.2d at 652.
99. Id. at 176, 172 N.W.2d 653. See also Note, Nuisance: Air Pollution and Doctrine
of Comparative Injury, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 390 (1971).
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public prosecutions of air pollution sources.
One explanation for this judicial unwillingness to uphold official prosecutions of air polluters lies in the court's traditional reluctance to interfere with the workings of the self-regulating market.
A lawsuit brought by a private citizen-landowner against an airpolluting manufacturing enterprise usually had focused market
impact. If the polluting enterprise was fined or even temporarily
enjoined from emitting pollutants, the court decision only had
immediate effect on that one manufacturer. Several conditions had
to be present before other polluters were bound by the decision: (1)
Other pollution receptors must live near the polluter; (2) The polluter's emissions must affect these receptors; (3) One of these receptors must be annoyed enough by the emissions to desire legal relief;
(4) This receptor must have a fairly good idea of the source of the
emissions; and (5) The receptor must have enough will and financial resources to initiate an action in court. It was only after these
five conditions were satisfied that a previous court decision against
a single air polluter had relevance to other polluters.
Unlike the citizen-plaintiff who typically had little desire and
few financial resources to begin court actions, it was the full-time
job of the public prosecutor to sue those who offended a community's welfare. In most instances the prosecutor was required by
statute or ordinance to institute legal proceedings against air polluting nuisance-producers. In some cases these laws required the
public prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings against air polluters. Judicial favor for the public air resource protector was thus
likely to have greater market impact than occasional court decisions which granted relief to relatively isolated citizen pollution
receptors. Therefore, even after courts were generally willing to
protect individual landowners from productive air pollution
sources, they were still reluctant to affirm actions brought against
these air polluters by public prosecutors. It was not until air quality
in Wisconsin had deteriorated significantly that the judiciary was
ready to uphold public prosecutions of air polluters who produced
goods for market.
Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions reviewing public prosecutions of air resource polluters fall into three categories: (1) cases
where the prosecuting attorney represented a city, town, or village;
(2) cases where the public prosecutor represented a county; and (3)
cases where the person instigating prosecution was the attorney
general, and the action was brought on behalf of the state. These
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public officers typically instituted legal proceedings against air polluters on the basis of statutes and ordinances which prohibited
nuisances. Only rarely did prosecutors sue to enforce special antiair pollution rules made by administrative agencies. Indeed, the
most successful prosecutions occurred when the state's attorney
general used Wisconsin's general nuisance statute to enjoin air
polluters already under regulation by the state's air pollution control agency.
A. Municipal ProceedingsAgainst Air Polluters
Disfavor for governmental interference with market actors was
evident in the 1890 case of City ofJanesville v. Carpenter.' There
the Wisconsin Supreme court refused to grant a city's request that
construction of the defendant's building be enjoined; the court
stated that it was dissatisfied with the sufficiency of the complaint
which alleged that the building's location in the Rock River would
restrict the flow of water and obstruct "the circulation of air."
Forty-eight years later, in Juneau v. Badger CooperativeOil Co.,'
the court held that the city of of Juneau was not entitled to enjoin
as a potential air pollution nuisance the construction of defendant's
oil refinery. According to the state's general nuisance statute,, 2
actions to abate public nuisances must be prosecuted by the attorney general or by a private individual. The court held that a city
was not a private individual.
Although the state legislature amended the general nuisance
statute in 1939 to give cities, towns, and villages the power to sue
to abate nuisances, the Wisconsin Supreme Court continued to
frustrate municipal prosecutions of air pollution nuisances during
the 1940's. In the important case of Milwaukee v. Milbrew,03 the
court overturned a lower court conviction of one of Milwaukee's
100. 77 Wis. 288, 46 N.W. 128 (1890).
101. 227 Wis. 620, 279 N.W. 666 (1938).
102. Wis. REV. STAT. (1939), ch. 423, §§ 208.01-02 gave public nuisance abatement
powers to cities, villages, and towns. State attorneys general made clear their opinion that

Wisconsin towns had no power to regulate slaughterhouses or rendering plants, or, in the
absence of statutory approval, to maintain an action in their name to enjoin a public
nuisance. 20 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 561 (1931); 29 Op. ATr'Y. GEN. 76 (1940).
103. 240 Wis. 527, 3 N.W.2d 386 (1942). Defendants in the Milbrew case cited the
Pennoyer v. Allen case for the proposition that "every business that imparts a degree of

impurity to the atmosphere is not a nuisance per se." Appellant's brief, p. 14. Plaintiffs cited
Pennoyer for the proposition that air pollution, by its very nature, affected people on
adjacent property. Respondent's brief, p. 7. The Pennoyer case had a little something in it

for everybody.
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most offensive air polluters. The Milbrew Company, which dried
brewer's yeast, had been charged with violating a Milwaukee ordinance which declared that plants and factories emitting offensive
odors and gases were public nuisances. Although the city produced
twenty-five witnesses who testified as to the stench and smoke
emitted by the defendant's plant, and despite the fact that the trial
judge viewed the Milbrew premises and agreed that the emissions
were "awful," the supreme court accepted the defendant's argument that no connection had been proved between any illness and
Milbrew's emissions. The court grounded its decision on the failure
of the city to show substantial, specific harm caused by the defendant's air pollution. According to Justice Fairchild, "a municipality's interest [in air pollution sources] should be aroused only when
there is physical injury to property or occupant, where injury is
substantial, and the facts are weighty."' 4
For many years the Milbrew case stood as a substantial bar to
local pollution control efforts. The court seemed to ask the impossible, that local government officials prove in all air pollution cases
that the defendant's emissions caused specifically focused "substantial injury;" most air pollution damage was more subtle in
impact. Substantial specific injury occurred, if at all, only after
long exposure. In addition, the court's approach ignored the likely
reality of general public loss from gradual deterioration of the air.
Local health officials could not meet Justice Fairchild's requirement of proving "weighty" physical injury for twenty-five years;
it took at least that long for science and medicine to develop skills
necessary to establish the link between long term air pollution
concentrations and measurable physical impact.
Yet, even if such a cause and effect tie had been impossible to
prove, the court's attitude toward municipal management of air
polluting sources would have certainly deterred much regulatory
vigor. The court was intent upon protecting those who produced
goods for market. Should a municipality attempt to enjoin business altogether (e.g. the Juneau case) or pursue an industry with
criminal convictions (e.g. the Milbrew case), the court was quick
to limit the local governmental action. Indeed, so strong was
judicial favor for market producers that the city promised that
should the lower court decision be affirmed, the defendant would
not be prohibited from continuing its business. The Milbrew court
104. Id. at 531, 3 N.W.2d at 389.
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did not find such promises to be very convincing. The court was
well aware of the economic chaos caused by the Depression and
World War II and did not wish to risk imposing additional restraints on business. As Justice Fairchild concluded in Milbrew:
"We cannot shut our eyes to the obvious truth that if the running
of this mill can be enjoined, almost any manufactory can be enjoined." '
The supreme court showed favor to unregulated market processes not only when local government officials attempted to restrict the operation of air polluters. The court was equally willing
to strike down municipal action designed to protect air polluting
enterprise. In Boerschinger v. Elkay Enterprises,Inc.,"' the court
invalidated attempts by a town to except air polluters from the
dictates of its zoning plan. The court held that once a town had
adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance which created districts
where certain polluting plants were prohibited, the town could not
thereafter amend the ordinance so as to grant an exception to one
owner. The Boerschinger case might be interpreted as a judicial
decision to maintain separation between social cost producers and
ultimate consumers who previously had to bear those costs. But
Boerschingeralso reflected a judicial reluctance to allow any kind
of external interference with the workings of the self-regulating
market.
B. County Action Against Air Pollution Sources
The Wisconsin Supreme Court was equally reluctant to uphold
the power of county agencies to regulate activities which polluted
the air. In Hartung v. City and County of Milwaukee,"7 the court
refused to accept Milwaukee County's contention that operation
of defendant's trucks in a rock quarry constituted a public nuisance
in violation of Milwaukee's heavy trucking ordinances. Despite the
fact that the trucks raised large volumes of dust, the trial and
supreme court held that the operation of trucks was a valid, preexisting, non-conforming use. Therefore the trucks were not a pub105. Id. Justice Fairchild's fear of enjoining "almost any manufactory" was originally
expressed in the 1871 case of Gilbert v. Showerman, 24 Mich. 448, 456'(1871). This fear
was well grounded in one sense. Anti-pollution technology had not reached the point by
1942 that manufacturers such as the Milbrew Company could control their air pollution

emissions even if they wanted to.
106. 32 Wis. 2d 168, 145 N.W.2d 475 (1966).
107. 2 Wis. 2d 269, 86 N.W.2d 475 (1957).
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lic nuisance that could be regulated by county law. The Hartung
decision reflected a long standing judicial tendency to protect
transport entities. The court believed that transportation vehiclesoperated under potentially greater cumulative liabilities than enterprises of fixed location. Transport entities assisted the flow of
commerce and the court was willing to except such from nuisance
ordinances.
A more significant judicial erosion of county authority in the
air pollution field took place in Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc.
v. City of West Allis.' In Highway 100, three plaintiffs whose
business consisted of burning old auto bodies sought to declare as
invalid a West Allis ordinance prohibiting such burning. The trial
court held that the city ordinance was unenforceable and invalid
because a Milwaukee County smoke ordinance had pre-empted the
city ordinance.' 0 The trial court also went on to hold that the auto
burning operation was not a nuisance. Citing the Hartungcase, the
lower court judge found that the city of West Allis had failed to
meet its burden of showing that the defendants' operation was a
public and not a private nuisance.' On appeal, West Allis claimed
that the legislature had conferred implicit power on cities to regulate such auto burning operations through statutes allowing cities
to regulate "dense smoke""' and "offensive industry.""' West
Allis also pointed out that the legislature had previously defeated
attempts to give Milwaukee County odor control powers. The auto
wreckers countered this argument by claiming (again) that Milwaukee County had the requisite statutory and ordinance power to
regulate noxious gases and fumes. According to the auto burners,
West Allis was thus precluded from maintaining any action because Milwaukee County had pre-empted the air pollution field.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the trial court and held
that the county smoke ordinance did not permit counties to
regulate by-products of combustion. Therefore, ruled the court, the
city ordinances had not been pre-empted by the county ordinance.
The city ordinance, in turn, not only prohibited the smoke108. 6 Wis. 2d 637, 96 N.W.2d 423 (1959).
109. See Chapter 88 of General Ordinance of Milwaukee County (1957).
110. The trial court decision based in part on the fact that the operators were "honorable", and the business of burning old autos was a useful and necessary business, "an
essential element of the state's economy."
I11. Wis. STAT. § 146.10 (1971).
112. Wis. STAT. § 66.052 (1971).
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producing activities of the auto wreckers, but the ordinance was
also valid and reasonable. Such judicial favor for local government
control of air pollution nuisances flew directly in the face of Milwaukee County's smoke ordinance. This ordinance clearly gave the
Milwaukee County Department of Air Pollution Control the
power to regulate smoke, gases, and fumes, all of which were
emitted by burning car bodies. The Highway 100 court reversed
itself only after it had received a strongly worded petition for
rehearing from the auto wreckers which again pointed out the
language of the Milwaukee County smoke control ordinance. On
rehearing, the court reluctantly conceded that county smoke regu3
lations had indeed pre-empted the city ordinance."
It was not until the late 1960's that the court was at last willing
to admit that counties might be better suited to address air pollution problems than were cities. In the 1968 case of City of West
Allis v. Milwaukee County,"' the court held that although the
state's home rule amendment empowered cities to determine their
own "local affairs," the state legislature could still authorize counties to purchase land for refuse disposal and to construct pollutionreducing incinerator and waste-disposal systems. Implicit in the
West Allis case was an indication that, despite the teachings of
Hartung and Highway 100, the court was ready to accept the
usefulness of and need for more centralized, county-wide regulatory policies.
C. Attorney General ProsecutionsofAir Pollution Nuisances
In 1970, Attorney General Robert Warren defended the public's interest in unpolluted air by initiating a series of public nuisance actions against air polluters. Warren thus became the first
attorney general in Wisconsin's history to use the attorney general's office to prosecute those whose only offense had been to
pollute the air in such a way as to constitute a public nuisance.
Warren based most of his nuisance actions on a 1905 Wisconsin
statute which allowed public nuisance actions to "be commenced
and prosecuted in the name of the state, . . .by the attorney

general upon his own information."" 5

113. On rehearing the supreme court noted that § 88.11(8) of the county smoke ordinance did regulate gases and fumes, and the court's previous opinion had overlooked this.
One curious fact about the Highway 100 case is that county smoke department officials

argued that the county did not have power to regulate the auto business.
114. 39 Wis. 2d 356, 159 N.W.2d 36 (1968).
115. Wis. Laws 1905, ch. 145; Wis. REV. STAT. (1906), § 3180(a); Wis. REv. STAT.
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After Warren took office in 1969, he and his deputy, Arvid
Sather, announced that one of the first acts of the Warren regime
would be to "take on major air polluters" under the state's public
nuisance statute. The Dairyland Power Co-operative power plant
in Alma, Wisconsin became the first industry cited by the attorney
general's office. This seemed a good choice. Three Alma area
farmers, as mentioned previously, had successfully sued the firm
in 1969 because plant discharges had injured crops. Moreover, a
Clean Air for Alma Committee had gathered 150 signatures
demanding governmental action against the plant. So, in June of
1970, Warren signed a complaint that charged the Dairyland
Power Co-operative with operating a plant that "emits fumes,
smoke, gases, soot and other particles and chemicals so as to contaminate and pollute the atmosphere." The complaint sought an
injunction restraining the utility from operating the plant so as to
create a public nuisance. Warren also requested the court to order
the utility to commence the installation of pollution abatement
equipment to reduce air pollution caused by the Alma plant."'
Officials from the Dairyland Power Co-operative attacked
Warren's suit as being politically motivated. "Warren needed a
campaign issue because of election year and chose the Alma plant
for that issue," charged one disgruntled Dairyland official."'
Meanwhile, attorneys for the firm challenged the complaint on two
important grounds. First, Dairyland's demurrer asserted that the
public nuisance statute was designed only to abate such patently
illegal activities as gambling operations and houses of prostitution;
the statute was not meant to shut down legitimate businesses engaged in the vital generation of power. Secondly, it asserted that
the Wisconsin Clean Air Act of 1967 had pre-empted the field of
air pollution control and superseded the power of the attorney
general to proceed against air polluters under the nuisance statute.
Both bases of the demurrer were predicated on the provisions of
the 1967 act which (1) set up a comprehensive administrative
(1903), § 3180(a); \Vis. REV. STAT. (1925), § 280.02. See Wis. Laws 1971, ch. 331, which
provided that in public nuisance litigation, there shall be no stays except if there is an appeal
within 5 days of entry ofjudgment. This was an attempt to speed up the execution of public

nuisance actions.
116. Pollution Charge Names Alma Firm, Milwaukee Sentinel, June 5, 1970; Jost v.
Dairyland Power Corp., 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1969).
117. Alma Plant Official Sees Politics Behind Pollution Suit, Madison Capital Times,

June 12, 1970; Co-op Attacks Suit to Stop its Plant, Wisconsin State Journal, June 27,
1970; Wis. Laws 1967, ch. 83.
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scheme to deal with air pollution through the state Department of
Natural Resources (DNR), and (2) allegedly fixed responsibility in
the attorney general only to enforce abatement orders issued by
DNR.
Had Dairyland Power won its pre-emption argument, attorneys general would have been foreclosed from bringing public nuisance actions against air polluters. Fortunately, both trial and appellate courts held that the attorney general's statutory nuisance
powers were independent of any powers given DNR under the
Clean Air Act. In State of Wisconsin v. DairylandPower Cooperative,""the Wisconsin Supreme Court opened the doors to future
court relief in air pollution cases by noting that air pollution problems did not necessarily require specialized scientific knowledge
which only administrative agencies and not courts possessed.
The court then went on to strike down Dairyland's contention that
no air polluting activity in the state could be deemed a public
nuisance unless a DNR order directed that the activity be stopped.
According to the court, the existence of a public nuisance was a
matter of fact and was not dependent on a DNR determination.
Warren had stated a cause of action in his complaint, and the court
ordered the case to be heard on the merits.
Although Dairyland was the only Wisconsin Supreme Court
case which directly addressed an instance where the state's attorney general had prosecuted an air polluter under Wisconsin's public nuisance statute, Warren's office initiated several such cases in
lower courts subsequent to the Dairyland decision. As in
Dairyland, these lower courts found in favor of the attorney
general."' The Wisconsin judiciary seemed willing at last to sanction public prosecutions of air polluters who produced goods and
services for market.
V.

CONCLUSION

The record of judicial responses to air pollution in Wisconsin
is one largely based upon prevailing popular values. When contemporary community attitudes in the nineteenth century acquiesced
118. State of Wisconsin v. Dairyland Power Cooperative, Memorandum Opinion by

Judge John Bartholomew, Buffalo County Circuit Court (Oct. 1, 1970); State v. Dairyland
Power Cooperative, 52 Wis. 2d 45, 187 N.W.2d 878 (1971).
119. State v. Pickands-Mather and Co., Stipulation Case No. 397-001, Milwaukee

County Cir. Ct. (1972); State v. Neenah Foundry, No. 36549, Winnebago County Cir. Ct.
(1970).
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in or were indifferent towards private exploitation of the air resource, the judiciary generally supported the arguments of
polluter-defendants. Conversely, when the dominant twentieth century view was no longer that the natural use of air was for waste
disposal, Wisconsin judges translated this sentiment into law which
favored the interests of plaintiff-receptors. This shift in judicial
policy is unmistaken in the cases, and it consciously parallels the
gradual abandonment of Wisconsin's longstanding faith in rising
productivity through the market. An age which gave status to
profit-making and the role of the energetic entrepreneur would
seek and obtain from Wisconsin courts a common law which at
once protected and encouraged market-based values. But as the
growing social costs of private enterprise pushed environmental
concerns higher on the public's hierarchy of values, this earlier
judicial favor for market actors gave way to concern for consumer
values and clean air.
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